• Sorted by Date • Classified by Publication Type • Personal Home page •
Mark A. Olson, James C. Cox, Theo Offerman, and Arthur J. H.C. Schram. Competition For Versus On the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment. International Economic Review, 43(3):709–736, August 2002.
(unavailable)
Several European countries and Japan are in various stages of privatizing and/or introducing more competition in passenger rail service. This process has been furthered by a directive from the Commission of the European Communities (1991) requiring member states to separate operations from infrastructure on the books and give international groupings of trains access to their infrastructure. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management was assigned responsibility for making a recommendation to Parliament for choosing between competition for the rails and competition on the rails in increasing competition in the supply of passenger rail service. The Ministry commissioned the experiments reported here in order to acquire better understanding of the properties of the two alternative types of competition in the context of a simple stylized rail network. The experimental rail network includes station complementarity and time slot substitutability. It also includes trade offs between local and express trains. Competition on the rails involves allocation of rights to use station and time slot routes by price bids in a combinatorial auction. Competition for the rails involves allocation of rights to regional monopolies by fare-structure bids for supplying a pre-specified minimum transport schedule. The experiments include both allocation of rights and scheduling of trains on the network. The two forms of competition are evaluated with various criteria developed by the Ministry, including market prices and allocative efficiency.
@article{CoxOffermanSchram2002,
author = {Mark A. Olson and James C. Cox and Theo Offerman and
Arthur J. H.C. Schram},
title = {Competition For Versus On the Rails: A Laboratory
Experiment},
journal = {International Economic Review},
keywords = {pub},
year = 2002,
volume = 43,
number = 3,
pages = {709--736},
month = aug,
abstract = {Several European countries and Japan are in various
stages of privatizing and/or introducing more
competition in passenger rail service. This process
has been furthered by a directive from the
Commission of the European Communities (1991)
requiring member states to separate operations from
infrastructure on the books and give international
groupings of trains access to their
infrastructure. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of
Transport, Public Works, and Water Management was
assigned responsibility for making a recommendation
to Parliament for choosing between competition for
the rails and competition on the rails in increasing
competition in the supply of passenger rail
service. The Ministry commissioned the experiments
reported here in order to acquire better
understanding of the properties of the two
alternative types of competition in the context of a
simple stylized rail network. The experimental rail
network includes station complementarity and time
slot substitutability. It also includes trade offs
between local and express trains. Competition on the
rails involves allocation of rights to use station
and time slot routes by price bids in a
combinatorial auction. Competition for the rails
involves allocation of rights to regional monopolies
by fare-structure bids for supplying a pre-specified
minimum transport schedule. The experiments include
both allocation of rights and scheduling of trains
on the network. The two forms of competition are
evaluated with various criteria developed by the
Ministry, including market prices and allocative
efficiency.},
}
Generated by
bib2html.pl
(written by Mark A Olson
) on
Thu Aug 09, 2018 22:56:48
contact :
Mark A Olson<mark.olson AT molsonecon DOT org>